We study upper semi-continuity of the private and coarse core and the Walrasian expectations equilibrium correspondences for economies with differential information, with Boylan (1971) topology on agents' information fields.
Introduction
We study the behavior of several notions of competitive equilibrium and core in economies with differential information. Our aim is to check whether these solution concepts respond continuously to changes in agents' characteristics in the underlying economy. This is a basic problem in general equilibrium theory, that was studied by several authors in the context of economies with complete information. For instance, Kannai (1970) considered continuity properties of the core of a pure exchange economy, while Hildenbrand (1972) and Hildenbrand and Mertens (1972) investigated the continuity of the equilibrium-set correspondence. It turns out that both solution concepts are "upper semi-continuous": when the agents'characteristics converge, together with a selection from the solution of corresponding We wish to thank Carlos Herves, Nicholas Yannelis, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Correspondence to: E. Einy economies, then the limit of the selection belongs to the solution of the limiting economy.
In an economy with differential information every agent is characterized by his initial endowment of commodities (which is a random variable, whose value is determined by the realization of the state of nature), his state-dependent utility function, and his private information represented by a σ-field on the space of states of nature (i.e., an agent can tell whether the realized state of nature is contained in any given set from the field). In measuring "closeness" of these economies, the only non-standard part lies in evaluating the "distance" between agents'information endowments. We do so by means of Boylan (1971) metric, following Allen (1983) who was the first to apply topologies on information fields to economies with differential information. (Allen proved continuity 1 of the consumer demand and the value of information with respect to the Boylan metric.)
We first consider a notion of competitive equilibrium for economies with differential information, the Walrasian expectation equilibrium (WEE), introduced in Radner (1968 Radner ( , 1982 2 . In a WEE, all commodities are priced in every state of nature, and each agent maximizes ex-ante (expected) utility on his budget set, but his trades must be measurable with respect to his private information. We show that if the space of random commodity bundles is L m p (where m is the number of commodities, and 1 ≤ p < ∞) and the prices lie in its dual, then WEE correspondence is upper semi-continuous (see Theorem 1).
We do not consider an alternative equilibrium concept, that of "rational expectations," in studying continuity of equilibrium correspondences, because the lack of continuity is apparent in this case. Indeed, in a rational expectations equilibrium agents maximize their interim utility -expected utility conditional on private information and the information revealed by prices. Information revealed by prices may, however, have noticeable discontinuity in the transition to the limiting economy. An extreme example of such a discontinuity is provided by a sequence of fully revealing equilibrium price systems that converges to a constant price system, which of course reveals no information. This discontinuity of revealed information translates into discontinuity of the rational expectations equilibrium correspondence: the limit of agent's commodity bundles in equilibrium allocations may well be a suboptimal choice for the agent given the information revealed by prices in the limiting economy.
Our second focus is on core correspondences. In the literature there are several notions of core for economies with differential information (for a comprehensive survey see Glycopantis and Yannelis, 2004; Forges et al., 2002) . Among them, two notions stand out in having the important and useful property of being nonempty under quite general conditions on the economy. These are Wilson (1978) coarse core, where a blocking coalition considers its interim payoffs (following the revelation of private information to agents) given a common knowledge event, and Yannelis (1991) private core, where blocking is based on ex-ante payoffs, but measurability of all allocations with respect to agents' private information is required. We will confine our attention to these core correspondences.
3
The relation between the private core and WEE is analogous to that of the core and Walrasian equilibrium in a complete information economy -see Einy et al. (2001) for an equivalence result for economies with differential information and a continuum of traders. Despite this relation, it turns out that the private core correspondence differs from the WEE correspondence in its behavior. We show here that the private core correspondence may not be upper semi-continuous even in simple economies (see Example 1). However, the private core correspondence is upper semi-continuous for every converging sequence of economies where agents' information fields approach their limiting information fields from above (i.e., in the sequence agents are better informed than in the limit); see Theorem 2.
The private core correspondence is also upper semi-continuous when the limiting economy is a complete information economy (see Theorem 3). This is in line with the earlier result of Balder and Yannelis (2002) . They showed upper semicontinuity of the private core correspondence under very general conditions on the economies 4 , but required the quality of information along the converging sequence to be monotonically increasing, which is not needed in our setup. At the same time, our Theorem 3 stands in contrast to Krasa and Shafer (2001) , that showed discontinuity of this correspondence when the agents' common prior 5 over the set of states of nature changes, in a way that the information becomes complete in the end. Here we view the common prior as an invariable characteristic of the economy 6 (together with the set of agents, commodities, and the states of nature), and not as part of the agents' characteristics. Accordingly, in all our results the information fields of the agents (and their other characteristics) are allowed to change, but the common 3 Apart from the non-emptiness of these two core correspondences, there are more reasons for focusing attention only on them. As we shall see, neither one of these correspondences is upper semicontinuous in general, and we believe that with other core concepts, conceived in the similar spirit, the situation will likely be the same. Moreover, when incentive compatibility constraints are added to the notion of core (see Vohra, 1999) , restrictive assumptions must be imposed on the way the information is revealed, in order for the "reports" of agents to be well defined. In our setup, these restrictions take the following form: the information fields would have to be generated by partitions of the space of states of nature (a report is then simply an element of the paritition). Accordingly, an element of the incentive compatible core, which is a mechanism defined on products of all reports, changes its domain when the information endowments (the partitions) in the economy undergo changes. This introduces an additional difficulty in studying the behavior of this core correspondence, since it is not obvious how to define convergence of incentive compatible mechanisms with changing domains.
4 Balder and Yannelis (2002) only require weak convergence of core allocations in the sequence, while we need the L m 1 -norm convergence (see Sect. 2). Also, they work with significantly weaker assumptions on the space of states of nature and the utility functions, and allow for state-dependent consumptions sets.
5 To interpret the model of Krasa and Shafer (2001) in our setting, one has to view this common prior as defined on the product of the set of states of nature and the signals receivable by agents, rather than the set of states of nature alone (as we do here, with information fields as a device of revealing information). 6 Or, more precisely, of its information structure determined by the underlying economic data.
prior stays fixed. This is precisely what allows us to obtain the positive result of Theorem 3. Finally, we examine the coarse core correspondence, and find that it is also fragile, and may fail to be upper semi-continuous even when the private core correspondence is (see Example 2).
The model
We consider a pure exchange economy E with differential information. The commodity space is R m + . The set of agents is N = {1, 2, ..., n}. The uncertainty in the economy is described by a probability space (Ω, , µ) , where Ω is the space of states of nature, which we assume to be compact and metrizable, is a σ-field of subsets of Ω, and µ is the common prior of the agents -a (countably additive) probability measure on (Ω, ). Private information of agent i ∈ N is given by a σ-subfield i of ; that is, for every A ∈ i agent i knows whether the realized state of nature is contained in A.
For any 1 ≤ p < ∞ we write L m p for the Banach space of all -measurable
An N -assignment is simply referred to as assignment. There is a fixed initial assignment of commodities in the economy, e = (e 1 , ..., e n ); e i is referred to as the initial endowment of agent i. An S-allocation is an S-assignment x = (x i ) i∈S that 8 satisfies the feasibility constraint:
Given a subfield of , we use the extended notion of -measurability by calling a function, which is equal µ-almost everywhere to an -measurable function, also -measurable. A private S-allocation is an S-allocation x = (x i ) i∈S such that x i is i -measurable for every i ∈ S. An N -allocation (respectively, private N -allocation) is called an allocation (respectively, private allocation). We assume that the N -tuple of the initial endowments e = (e 1 , ..., e n ) is a private allocation.
The preferences of agent i over the commodity space are represented by a statedependent utility function, 
whenever the integral exists.
To sum up, an economy with differential information, E, is described by a collection (e i , u
. A possible interpretation 10 of the above economy is the following. It extends over two periods of time. In the first period there is uncertainty about the state of nature. In this period, agents make contracts on redistribution of their initial endowments either before the state of nature is realized (ex-ante) or after receiving their private information (interim). In the second period agents carry out previously made agreements, and consumption takes place.
In order to define convergence of economies with differential information, we use a pseudo-metric (introduced in Boylan, 1971 ) on the family * of σ-subfields of , given by
Finally, if X is a random variable on (Ω, , µ) and is a σ-subfield of , denote by E(X | ) the conditional expectation 14 of X with respect to .
10 This paragraph is a quotation from Allen and Yannelis (2001), p. 265, slightly modified to fit our setting.
11 We use the language of "convergence of economies" only for the sake of convenience. As was mentioned in the introduction, the convergence here is actually restricted to the agents' characteristics.
12 By "→ L m p k→∞ " we denote convergence in the L m p -norm. 13 Note that with this form of convergence of utility functions, the underlying preferences may fail to converge (for instance, when u i k is defined as
converges to u i ≡ 0). However, this only makes our upper semi-continuity results (Theorems 1, 2, and 3) stronger, since there is no explicit assumption on convergence of the underlying preferences. And the discontinuity we show in Examples 1 and 2 is not due to this phenomenon: in both examples, utility functions of agents are fixed for all economies.
14 Since E(X | ) is usually defined as a class of functions, we will always take a selection from it.
3 Continuity of Walrasian expectations equilibrium correspondence Radner (1968 Radner ( , 1982 introduced the notion of Walrasian expectations equilibrium (WEE) for economies with differential information. In this section we study continuity of the WEE correspondence.
In what follows we consider commodity bundles that are members of
be an economy with differential information. A price system π is a non-negative function in the unit sphere of L m q (i.e., π q = 1), where q ∈ (1, ∞] is such that ) is representable by a unique price system π ϕ : for any commodity bundle x, ϕ(x) = Ω π ϕ · xdµ. Given a price system π, the budget set of i ∈ N is given by
= x∈L m p |x is non-negative and i -measurable and
, where π is a price system and
The following theorem (whose proof, together with all other proofs, is brought in Sect. 6) establishes upper semi-continuity of the WEE correspondence.
, where e i is strictly positive for
One may ask whether the L m q -norm convergence of price systems can be replaced with the weak* convergence 15 , without affecting the result. The answer is negative, as will be made clear in Example 1 of the next section. In this example we will also show that confining attention to WEE allocations only does not yield an upper semi-continuous correspondence.
Continuity of the private core
In this section we study the continuity of the private core of an economy with differential information, introduced in Yannelis (1991) .
be an economy with differential information. The private core of E consists of all private allocations x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) for which there do not exist a non-empty coalition S ⊆ N and a private S-allocation y = (y i ) i∈S , such that
15 When 1 < p, the weak* convergence is of course equivalent to the weak convergence.
for every i ∈ S. As was said in the introduction, in complete information economies the core correspondence is upper semi-continuous (see, e.g., Kannai, 1970 
, µ is the restriction of the Lebesgue measure on the real line to Ω (normalized so as to satisfy 
Note that
since, otherwise, for S = {1} the S-allocation y =(e 1 k ) satisfies
contrary to x k being a private core allocation in the economy E k (that is, x k is not individually rational). Individual rationality of x k also implies
From (5), (6), and (4) we deduce that
16 Existence of a private core allocation in such an economy can be established by using arguments of Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2001) (where existence was established with the "no free disposal" condition). Alternatively, one can show nonemptiness of the private core of Eε by checking that it contains the initial endowments allocation. 
Consider now a converging subsequence of {(a
converges to E 0 . However, x is not a private core allocation of E 0 . Indeed, take S = N and y = (χ [0, 1] , χ [2, 3] ). This y is obviously a private allocation in E 0 , and
is satisfied for every i (that is, x is not Pareto-optimal). Note that this example would still work if the utility functions were slightly modified to become strictly concave and strictly increasing. The compact set Ω could also be made connected without affecting our claim.
Our final observation is that there is a sequence of WEE in {E k } ∞ k=1 that does not converge to a WEE in E 0 . Indeed, the "no trade" scenario (e, π k ), where e consists of the initial endowments of the agents and π k (viewed as a function in L 1 q ) is given by
clearly does not converge in the L 1 qnorm. It does converge weakly*, but to the zero function. This shows that Theorem 1 cannot be strengthened by assuming that {π k } ∞ k=1 converges to π weakly* (since π can be zero despite that π k q = 1 for every k).
In the limiting economy E 0 , every WEE has the form (y, π), where y = (χ [0, 1] , χ [2, 3] ) (almost everywhere) and [0, 1] 
This shows that the set of WEE allocations W EEA is also not upper semicontinuous: e ∈W EEA(E k ) for every k, but W EEA(E 0 ) = {y} and y = e.
In the above example the limiting information field is neither included, nor includes, the information fields that converge to it. However, when this does not occur, positive results on upper semi-continuity of the private core can be obtained.
be a sequence of economies with differential information that converges
According to Theorem 2, if the information fields of agents shrink when they approach the limiting information fields (which can be the case when, e.g., the level of random noise increases in the limit), then the private core is upper semicontinuous. Theorem 3 below may be viewed as a dual result, showing that the private core is also upper semi-continuous when the information of agents expands to the fullest possible extent, i.e., when the economies converge to a complete information economy. As was said in the Introduction, it is related to the result of Balder and Yannelis (2002) , who established continuity of the private core correspondence in more general economies, but when information endowments are increasing monotonically. At the same time, Theorem 3 stands in contrast to the result of Krasa and Shafer (2001) , that shows generic discontinuity of the private core correspondence when the complete information is approached by changing the common prior belief of agents (rather than by expanding their information fields).
be a sequence of economies with differential information that converges to E = (e i , u
, where i = for every i ∈ N, is the σ-field of all Borel sets in Ω, and each e i is a continuous and strictly positive function. Assume also that for every two disjoint and closed subsets A and B of Ω there exist A 
The coarse core
be an economy with differential information. The coarse core of E consists of all allocations x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) for which there do not exist a non-empty coalition S ⊆ N, an event A ∈ i∈S i with µ(A) > 0 (where i∈S i denotes the intersection of all i , i ∈ S, and represents the common knowledge of agents in S), and an S-assignment y = (y i ) i∈S , that satisfy the following conditions:
According to (i), y is feasible for agents in S, given the event A and their initial endowments. And (ii) means that agents in S can improve their conditional expected utility when they redistribute their endowments according to y, given that A occurred. The concept of coarse core (introduced by Wilson, 1978) thus disallows existence of such S, A, and y. Wilson (1978) proved that the coarse core is non-empty under standard conditions on the economy, at least when the set of states of nature is finite. The following example shows that the coarse core may not be upper semi-continuous, even when the private core is 19 .
Example 2. Consider a sequence of economies
with m = 2 and n = 4, where:
2) e i k is state-independent, and e 4) µ is a measure on Ω according to which µ({ω 2j }) = µ({ω 2j+1 }) > 0 for every j ≥ 0;
, Ω}; that is, 1 and 2 can only tell whether the realized state of nature has even or odd index;
; that is, 3 and 4 can actually know the state of nature, provided its index is less than k.
It is clear that the sequence {E
only in the following respect: 3 = 4 is the field of all subsets of Ω. Now consider an assignment x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ), where x 1 (ω 2j ) = x 2 (ω 2j+1 ) = (50, 50) and x 1 (ω 2j+1 ) = x 2 (ω 2j ) = (70, 70) for every j ≥ 0, and x 3 = x 4 ≡ (60, 60). It is obvious that x is an allocation for all economies in {E k } ∞ k=1 , and for E. We show first that x is not a coarse core allocation for E. Indeed, S = {2, 3} can improve the conditional expected utility of both 2 and 3 given that the state of nature has an odd index. We simply take A = {ω 2j+1 } ∞ j=0 (which is clearly in the common knowledge of 2 and 3 in E: A ∈ 2 ∧ 3 ), and y = (y i ) i∈S defined by 69, 69) . Then (i) and (ii) are satisfied, and hence x is not a coarse core allocation for E.
Our next step is to show that x is a coarse core allocation for every E k . (This will imply that the coarse core correspondence indeed lacks upper semi-continuity.) To this end suppose that there are k, S, A, and y that satisfy (i) and (ii) in the economy E k . It is easy to see that x is individually rational (given each trader's information), and so S must contain more than one trader. 19 In this example, information fields of the first two agents are fixed in the converging sequence of economies, while for the other (last) two agents the information fields approximate full infomation. The proof of Theorem 3 can be used to show that the limit of any converging sequence of private core allocations will be a private core allocation in the limiting economy (commodity bundles y 1 and y 2 , if used by a blocking coalition in E, will not even have to be approximated by a continuous function in order to show that E(y 1 | 1 k ) and E(y 2 | 2 k ) approximate them uniformly).
Note that (ii) implies
for every i ∈ S, since A is an element of every
At the same time, from concavity and homogeneity of u and (i) it follows that:
A i∈S
If S = {1, 2} or S = {3, 4}, then for each ω i∈S u(x i (ω)) = 480 = 240|S|, and so (7) and (8) Thus, (7) and (8) lead to a contradiction again. We conclude that there exist no k, S, A, and y that satisfy (i) and (ii) in the economy E k , and therefore x is a coarse core allocation in every E k . 
Proof. We will show that X = E(X | 0 ) almost everywhere. Since L 1 -norm convergence implies convergence in measure, {X k } ∞ k=1 converges to X in measure. Thus, it suffices to show that {X k } ∞ k=1 converges in measure also to E(X | 0 ).
For every k,
and hence the first summand in (10) converges to zero in measure. And 
Proof. Due to the uniform convergence of {u
is uniformly integrable (see Proposition II.5.4 of Neveu, 1965 ) and x is integrable. Consequently, we can find M > 1 with:
21 As will become evident in the proof, these three requirements could be replaced by the following (weaker) condition:
Note that concavity and monotonicity of each u k (ω, ·), and the convergence of
for all k, ω ∈ Ω, and x ∈ R l + . In particular, the integral
(Here χ S stands for the characteristic function of the set S). We will show that each I j is less than ε for all sufficiently large k, and this will prove the lemma. The uniform convergence of
immediately yields lim k→∞ I 1 = 0, and thus
for all sufficiently large k. Inequality (11) implies that
and by our choice of M, 
≤M and x(ω) ≤M } converges in measure to zero, and thus lim k→∞ I 3 = 0 by the generalized bounded convergence theorem. Once again, I 3 < ε for all sufficiently large k. Finally,
The first summand in the above expression is less than ε 3 for all sufficiently large k, which yields
Proof of Theorem 1. We have to show that (x, π) is a WEE of E. Note first that
has a subsequence that converges pointwise almost everywhere, and thus x also satisfies the feasibility constraint (1) (for S = N ).
Next, for every
By Hölder inequality,
, and hence by (13)
It is also obvious that
From (14), (15) it follows that x i ∈ B i (π) for every i ∈ N . It remains to show that for every i ∈ N, x i maximizes U i on B i (π). Indeed, if this were not true, there would exist i ∈ N and y i ∈ B i (π) with
by Lemma 2, and thus w.l.o.g. y i is bounded and satisfies
(otherwise it can be replaced by some
k→∞ y i because of the uniform boundedness of y i k and y i , and it can be established similarly to (14) that
Together with (15) and (16) 
this implies that y
where U i k is defined by (2) for the utility function u k . This cannot be consistent with
We reached a contradiction, which leads to the conclusion that (x, π) ∈ W EE(E).
Proof of Theorem 2. As in the proof of Theorem 1, x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) is a private allocation in E. Assume, however, that x is not in the private core of E. Then there exist a non-empty coalition S and a private S-allocation y = (y i ) i∈S such that
for every i ∈ S.
We will now modify y to obtain an S-allocation in E k for a certain large k. For every ε > 0 denote
and let k(ε) be some positive integer such that
k→∞ e i and hence e i k → k→∞ e i in measure. For this reason, we can also choose {k(ε)} ε>0 in a way that k(ε) is non-increasing in ε and lim ε 0 k(ε) = ∞ 23 . Clearly, for almost every ω ∈ Ω and every commodity j
where 1 = (1, ..., 1) ∈ R m (this inequality follows from the fact that y satisfies the feasibility constraint in E and the definition of
for every ω ∈ Ω and every commodity j, satisfies the feasibility constraint in E k(ε) : 
Due to assumption (17), these two equalities yield existence of r for which
Proof of Theorem 3. As in the proof of Theorem 2, if the limit allocation x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) is not in the private core of E, there exist a non-empty coalition S and a private S-allocation y = (y i ) i∈S such that
for every i ∈ S. We can assume w.l.o.g. that each y i is bounded. (Otherwise it can be replaced by min(y i , M), which converges to
, and thus this replacement will leave (20) intact for sufficiently large M. Clearly, the replacement also leads to a private allocation.) We will show next that it can also be assumed w.l.o.g. that each y i is continuous. By Lusin theorem, for every ε > 0 and i ∈ S there exists a continuous function y
Since these subsets of a compact metric space Ω are disjoint and closed (here we use continuity of both e i and y i ε for every i ∈ S), they can be separated, i.e., there is a continuous function c :
for every i ∈ S, commodity j, and ω ∈ Ω, satisfies the feasibility constraint in E :
Since each y i ε is i -measurable as a continuous function on Ω (recall that i = is the σ-field of all Borel sets in Ω), y ε is in fact a private S-allocation that consists of continuous functions. Moreover, for each i ∈ S and a commodity j
for almost every ω ∈ i∈S (A i ε ) c , since y satisfies the feasibility constraint i∈S y i (ω) ≤ i∈S e i (ω) for almost every ω ∈ Ω and hence µ( i∈S (A 
Similarly,
for almost every ω ∈ D l K (j). We conclude that
(This means that {z
converges to y i uniformly (almost everywhere).) Thus
for almost every ω ∈ Ω. Now denote
for every i ∈ S, commodity j, and ω ∈ Ω. It is clear that {y Due to (20), there exists K such that
for every i ∈ S. This contradicts the assumption that x k(K) is a private core allocation in E k(K) .
